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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of COVID-19, pharmaceutical companies rushed to 
produce vaccinations and continue to work on developing treatments, 
while the tension caused by reverse payments intensifies between patent 
and antitrust law. Lawmakers must address this tension, and the current 
pandemic should serve as a catalyst to prompt reform at the legislative 
level. By amending the Hatch-Waxman Act, lawmakers can ease the 
increasing strain between patent and antitrust policy concerns. In 2013, the 
U.S. Supreme Court attempted to resolve this tension in its landmark 
decision, F.T.C. v. Actavis, but the tension remains as lower courts struggle 
to produce a uniform standard when applying Actavis to reverse payment 
settlements arising as a result of the current Hatch-Waxman Act 
provisions. Much scholarship exists explaining and addressing the 
lingering issues surrounding reverse payment settlements. However, no 
better time exists to address this heightened problem in the pharmaceutical 
context than now—amidst the COVID-19 pandemic devastating the 
United States. Lawmakers must act now to shield consumers from big 
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The fundamental goal of antitrust law “is to prevent or eliminate 
practices that interfere with free competition.”1 Antitrust laws “are 
designed to promote a vigorous and competitive economy in which each 
business enterprise has a full opportunity to compete on the basis of price, 
quality, and service.”2 Patents, however, are the exception to the rule. In 
the big pharma3 context,4 a patent gives the pharmaceutical company 
developing a new drug a “legal monopoly over the production—and 
profit—of that drug.”5 In granting patents for drugs to pharmaceutical 
companies, the United States government seeks to protect innovation and 
reward investment.6 While antitrust law aims to prevent monopolies, 
patent law permits limited monopolies.7 And just as the patent exception 
 
 1. Phillip A. Proger, Antitrust Primer, in 2010 AM. HEALTH L. ASS’N SEMINAR PAPERS 1, 1 
(2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. “Big pharma” is defined as “large pharmaceutical companies considered especially as a 
politically influential group.” Big Pharma, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Big%20Pharma [https://perma.cc/ZT7L-XYRH]. 
 4. Although I mention the pharmaceutical context specifically, patents grant limited monopolies 
to a broad range of companies. See Audra J. Passinault, Note, A Prescription for the Future: Reverse-
Payment Settlements in the Wake of FTC v. Actavis Pharmaceuticals, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 549, 549 (2015). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/P9Y9-KA5Q]; Passinault, supra note 
4, at 549. 
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to antitrust law appears utilitarian, this exception also has an exception: 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.8 
The Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug companies to enter the 
pharmaceutical market sooner by using a brand-name pharmaceutical 
company’s approval efforts⎯so long as the generic drugs comprise the 
same active ingredients and are bioequivalent.9 This exception is unique 
because it allows the generic drug company to obtain Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval for a generic equivalent without having to 
submit extensive safety and efficacy data typically required to submit  
a New Drug Application (NDA).10 Therefore, generic drug companies 
may gain the right to distribute drugs with essentially the same  
ingredients as the patent holders’ drugs before the patent term, or limited 
monopoly, expires. 
To achieve its goal, the “Hatch–Waxman Act sets forth special 
procedures for identifying, and resolving, related patent disputes.”11 
Principally, in order to piggyback on brand-name drug manufacturers’ 
work, generic drug manufacturers must “‘assure the FDA’ that the generic 
drugs ‘will not infringe’ the brand-name’s patents.”12 If the generic drug 
manufacturer can demonstrate to the FDA that any listed, relevant patent 
is invalid or will not be infringed, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that 
such demonstration automatically shows patent infringement, meaning the 
generic company may enter the market before the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent expires.13 The most common way for the generic 
drug manufacturer to provide the FDA such assurance is for the generic 
drug company to “certify that any listed, relevant patent ‘is invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale’ of the drug described in 
the [generic drug company’s] Abbreviated New Drug Application 
[ANDA].”14 However, “[i]f the brand-name patentee brings an 
infringement suit within 45 days, the FDA then must withhold approving 
the generic . . . while the parties litigate patent validity (or infringement) 
in court.”15 As a result, the arrangement of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provides the public with access to the generic, more affordable version  
 
 8. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 9. Daryl Lim, The Defense Docket: Intellectual Property Litigation: Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: Practical Insights, 13 IN-HOUSE DEF. Q. 7, Winter 2018, at 1 [hereinafter The Defense 
Docket]. 
 10. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv); HATCH-WAXMAN ACT FUNDAMENTALS, Lexis (practice 
note updated July 28, 2018). 
 11. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 143 (2013). 
 12. Id. (quoting Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 406 
(2012)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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of a medication sooner than patent law would typically allow.  
In theory, the Hatch-Watchman Act exception to the patent law limited 
monopoly satisfies the goals of antitrust law by restricting limited 
monopolies in the pharmaceutical context. In actuality, however, this 
realization is not the case.16 
Big pharma circumvents the Hatch-Waxman Act requirements 
through agreements known as “pay-for-delay settlements,” “reverse 
payments,” or “reverse payment settlements,”17 where brand-name drug 
companies pay generic drug companies large sums of money or something 
of high value to settle patent litigation claims and “maximize their own 
profits.”18 Such reverse payments have the effect of postponing more 
affordable, generic medications entering the market and thus benefitting 
consumers.19 Further, these settlements can even restrict generic 
medications from entering the market for a longer period of time than 
patent law intended by extending the brand-name company’s limited 
monopoly.20 Not only can these “payments . . . produce significant 
anticompetitive effects” and harm consumers,21 but also these payments 
serve as a “surrogate for [the] patent’s weakness.”22 The U.S.  
Supreme Court undertook to resolve this conflict in its landmark decision, 
F.T.C. v. Actavis, but the patent-antitrust law relationship remains strained 
because of the confusion amongst lower courts about how to reconcile 
antitrust and patent law policy concerns while adhering to the Supreme 
Court’s decision.23 
This Note addresses the lingering unresolved tension in this  
post-Actavis era between patent and antitrust law over pay-for-delay 
settlements and proposes ways to relieve this tension. It also recommends 
that Congress confront this unresolved tension because big pharma will 
continue to deny citizens access to affordable medications absent a clear 
 
 16. See The Defense Docket, supra note 9, at 1. 
 17. Passinault, supra note 4, at 549. 
 18. Michele M. Kang, Note, ANDA Reverse Payments and Post-Actavis Landscape, 8 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 73, 75 (2016); Passinault, supra note 4, at 550. 
 19. Passinault, supra note 4, at 549, 555. 
 20. See Mariana Mazzucato, Big Pharma Is Hurting Drug Innovation, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/10/17/pharmaceutical/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D6LX-N7CM] (noting “pharmaceuticals [ab]use the patent system . . . [to] extend existing 
patents beyond the initial 20-year protection set by the United States”). Additionally, Chief Justice 
Roberts addresses this concern in his dissent in Actavis. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 162 (“If its actions 
go beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the patent, we have held that such actions are subject 
to antitrust scrutiny.”). 
 21. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 189 (D.R.I. 2014). “We rely on 
pharmaceutical companies to develop and bring to market the medical advances that keep us healthy.” 
Id. at 183. 
 22. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158. 
 23. Id. at 136. 
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legal standard that addresses both antitrust and patent policy concerns. 
Finally, this Note asks lawmakers to seriously consider the future 
ramifications of having a system that lacks uniformity in an area of law 
that severely impacts citizens’ access to medications, which is especially 
crucial during the current state of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Part I of this Note provides background information on patent 
infringement claims in the pharmaceutical context, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, and reverse payments. Part II of this Note explains the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Actavis, while Part III highlights the problems 
remaining under the post-Actavis regime. Lastly, Part IV of this  
Note concludes with a proposal that suggests possible legislative and 
common law solutions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Patent Infringement Claims 
The U.S. Constitution established patent protection by providing 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of [s]cience and useful 
[a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the 
exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”24 Patent 
law “gives patentees a limited exclusionary power.”25 Under the U.S. 
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–301, “[a] patent grants the patent holder the 
exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, importing, and 
selling the patented innovation for a limited period of time.”26 The idea 
behind this legislation is to “encourage the investment of time and 
resources into the development of new and useful discoveries” by granting 
these “exclusive rights” to the inventor.27 In the pharmaceutical context, 
this right applies to the “exclusive right to sell [a] drug.”28 
The patent holder is also said to have “limited monopoly” power 
because the patent allows the holder to gain financial rewards for their 
patented work.29 However, the patented work enters the public domain 
after the patent term expires.30 The “term begin[s] on the date on which 
the patent issues and end[s] 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent [is] filed in the United States.”31  
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 25. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531–32 (2017). 
 26. Patent, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/patent [https://perma.cc/7DVK-
3PQJ]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Kang, supra note 18, at 74. 
 29. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1532. 
 30. Patent, supra note 26. 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
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Although “encourag[ing] the investment of time and resources into the 
development of new and useful discoveries” is imperative to society,  
the Hatch-Waxman Act created a significant exception for the 
pharmaceutical industry in order to increase consumers’ access to 
affordable medications.32 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 
also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, was created to address antitrust 
policy concerns arising from the limited monopolies granted by patent law 
in the pharmaceutical context.33 Primarily, the Act addressed antitrust 
concerns of brand-name companies sustaining monopolies in the market 
and cutting off citizens’ access to cheaper, generic medications.34 
Congress’s purpose in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act was “to increase 
generic competition while balancing the resulting cost savings with 
sufficient incentives to encourage continued medical innovation through 
the development of new drugs.”35 The intent behind the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was to allow more competition in the market and provide the public 
access to generic (less expensive) medications before the expiration of the 
brand-name manufacturers’ patents.36 
To achieve its goal, the Hatch-Waxman Act changed the nature of 
patent infringement disputes in the pharmaceutical context. “Prior to the 
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers could 
only obtain approval by the FDA if they submitted the same sort of data 
supporting the drug’s safety and efficacy that brand-name drug 
manufacturers were required to submit.”37 Typically, “a drug 
manufacturer[] wishing to market a new prescription drug, must submit a 
New Drug Application [(NDA)] to the federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and undergo a long, comprehensive, and costly 
 
 32. Patent, supra note 26. “[G]eneric drugs save consumers an estimated eight to ten billion 
dollars a year at retail pharmacies, and even billions more when used by hospitals.” Kang, supra note 
18, at 74. 
 33. “The Hatch-Waxman Act, which brought about the abbreviated pathway for generic drug 
approval, spurred the growth of the current generic drug industry in the United States.” Kang, supra 
note 18, at 76. 
 34. “[G]eneric drug[s] . . . provide a safe, effective, and low-cost alternative to the American 
public.” Id. at 75. 
 35. Id. at 82. 
 36. PRAC. L. ANTITRUST, REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, Westlaw Note 0-
577-4285 (practice notes continually maintained); see also Kang, supra note 18, at 75. 
 37. Jennifer E. Sturiale, Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review: A New Sort 
of Competition, 69 ALA. L. REV. 59, 69 (2017); see also Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on 
Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 98 (2004). See generally Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9. 
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testing process, after which, if successful, the manufacturer will receive 
marketing approval from the FDA.”38 
However, the Hatch-Waxman Act created “a framework to allow 
generic-drug manufacturers to obtain FDA approval more quickly.”39 
“[O]nce the FDA has approved a brand-name drug for marketing,”40 the 
Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug manufacturers to “submit an 
[A]bbreviated [N]ew [D]rug [A]pplication (ANDA).”41 The legislation 
explicitly states that “[a]ny person may file . . . an [ANDA] for the 
approval of a new drug.”42 An ANDA is an “abbreviated route to FDA 
approval of a generic drug” because, “[i]nstead of filing a full [(NDA)], 
the generic drug company need only demonstrate in an ANDA that the 
generic product is bioequivalent to the reference-listed drug,” which cuts 
out the time-consuming testing processes required by an NDA.43 The 
generic drug manufacturer in the ANDA must specify “that the generic 
has the ‘same active ingredients as,’ and is ‘biologically equivalent’ to the 
already-approved brand-name drug.”44 Essentially, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act allows the generic drug companies to “piggy-back” on the brand-name 
company’s “approval efforts,” which in turn, accelerates the introduction 
of the low-cost generic medications into the market.45 
Also inherent in the Hatch-Waxman Act is a “special patent litigation 
scheme that enables patent infringement and validity issues to be 
determined before the generic drug is launched on the market.”46 The 
Hatch-Waxman Act sets forth specific procedures for “identifying, and 
resolving, related patent disputes.”47 Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
“requires the pioneer brand-name manufacturer to list in its [NDA] the 
‘number and the expiration date’ of any relevant patent,” and “it requires 
the generic manufacturer in its [ANDA] to ‘assure the FDA’ that the 
generic ‘will not infringe’ the brand-name’s patents.”48 The Act provides 
four ways in which the generic drug manufacturer can assure that it will 
not infringe the brand-name manufacturer’s patent: (1) by certifying “that 
 
 38. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 142 (2013); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) . 
 39. PRAC. L. ANTITRUST, supra note 36, at 4. 
 40. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142; see also Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
566 U.S. 399, 403 (2012). 
 41. Hatch-Waxman Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 19, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ 
drugs/abbreviated-new-drug-application-anda/hatch-waxman-letters [https://perma.cc/8PG8-SEHE]; 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1). 
 43. JANET B. LINN, HATCH-WAXMAN PRE-SUIT CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE GENERIC 
PERSPECTIVE (practice note updated July 30, 2020), Lexis. 
 44. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142 (quoting Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, 566 U.S. at 403). 
 45. Id.; see also Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, 566 U.S. at 403. 
 46. LINN, supra note 43, at 1. 
 47. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
 48. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143 (quoting Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, 566 U.S. at 403). 
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the brand-name manufacturer has not listed any relevant patents;” (2) by 
certifying “that any relevant patents have expired;” (3) by requesting 
“approval to market beginning when any still-in-force patents expire;”  
or (4) by certifying “that any listed, relevant patent ‘is invalid or will  
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale’ of the drug described  
in the [ANDA].”49 
The fourth option is most common and is often referred to as “the 
paragraph IV route” or “paragraph IV certification.”50 The paragraph IV 
route is the preferred avenue for Hatch-Waxman Act litigation because the 
Hatch-Waxman Act “provides a special incentive” for the first generic 
manufacturer to file an ANDA “taking the paragraph IV route[,]” where 
the first generic “applicant will enjoy a period of 180 days of 
exclusivity.”51 This provision is important because the first generic 
applicant enjoys “an exclusive right to sell a generic version of the  
brand-name product,”52 where no other generic manufacturer can enter the 
market for that drug during the 180 days.53 
In regard to patent litigation, one of the goals “of creating the 
[p]aragraph IV challenge process was to provide a mechanism through 
which generic manufacturers could challenge weak patents.”54 
Technically, the paragraph IV route “automatically counts as patent 
infringement” and triggers patent litigation.55 This route “serves as a 
statutorily defined act of infringement,” meaning that “in making a 
[p]aragraph IV certification, a generic drug manufacturer infringes a listed 
drug’s patent claims as a matter of law, not as a matter of fact,” which 
 
 49. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)). 
 50. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C.§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 
3d 180, 184 (D.R.I. 2014). 
 51. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143; see also LINN, supra note 43, at 2; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
This provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act also demonstrates the policy motives underlying the Act. 
The Act aims to encourage generic drugs to enter into the market more quickly, especially because 
“[i]f the first-to-file generic manufacturer can overcome any patent obstacle and bring the generic to 
market, this 180–day period of exclusivity can prove valuable” to the generic drug company by making 
the company more profitable as other generic drug companies will be prevented from diluting the 
market for 180 days. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 144; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D). “[T]he  
Hatch–Waxman Act serves to incentivize generic manufacturers that incur the cost and risk stemming 
from [p]aragraph IV certification litigation . . . [and] encourage generic competition” by affording this 
exclusivity. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 185. For more on this subject, see 
generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006) (article written prior to Actavis). 
 52. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155; see also id. at 144 (noting the value of such exclusivity: “this  
180–day period of exclusivity can prove valuable, possibly ‘worth several hundred million dollars’” 
(quoting Hemphill, supra note 51, at 1579)). 
 53. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155. 
 54. Laura A. Gregory, Note, Cashing Out: How Big Pharma Continues to Capitalize on the 
Antitrust Loophole Created in FTC v. Actavis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 107, 127 (2016). 
 55. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
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“then enables the patent owner to bring suit against the ANDA filer for 
patent infringement.”56 The brand-name manufacturer has forty-five days 
to bring an infringement suit, after which the FDA “must  
withhold approving the generic, usually for a 30–month period, while the 
parties litigate patent validity (or infringement) in court.”57 “If the courts 
decide the matter within that period, the FDA follows that 
determination,”58 meaning, if the court decides that the patent is invalid or 
not infringed, the approval will be made effective on the date of the 
judgment or settlement.59 If, alternatively, the court determines  
that the patent has been infringed and the case is not successfully appealed, 
the approval will be made effective no earlier than the expiration  
of the patent.60 Lastly, if the court does not decide the matter within that 
period, then “the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of 
the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt 
of . . . notice”61 and “the FDA may go forward and give approval to market 
the generic product.”62 
C. Reverse Payments 
A generic drug manufacturer’s journey to speedy market approval 
via paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act almost always ends in a 
 
 56. Sturiale, supra note 37, at 71. “An ANDA filer that relies on a [p]aragraph IV certification 
will almost certainly be sued by the brand manufacturer.” In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d at 184–85. 
 57. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143. If the applicant used the paragraph IV route to make a certification, 
“the approval may be made effective immediately unless, before the expiration of 45 days after the 
date on which the notice . . . is received, an action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the 
subject of the certification.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 58. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143. “If such an action is brought before the expiration of [the 45] days, 
the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the 
date of the receipt of the notice . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (“If the court “decides that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed . . . the approval shall be made effective” either on “the date on which the court enters 
judgment . . . or [on] the date of a settlement order or consent decree signed and entered by the court 
stating that the patent that is the subject of the certification is invalid or not infringed.”). 
 60. Id.  
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). “Notice” is “notice of opinion that [the] patent is invalid or will 
not be infringed.” Id. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
 62. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). In essence, the filing of an ANDA 
taking the paragraph IV route is an “artificial act” of patent infringement, meaning that it does not 
necessarily equate to a finding of patent infringement. Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest 
Laboratories, Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1283 (2008); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 
661, 677–78 (1990) (discussing the Hatch-Waxman Act and ANDA process in detail);  
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that the infringement is 
“artificial”). Rather, the purpose of the exception is to establish jurisdiction over a complaint for patent 
infringement based on the ANDA in the federal courts. HATCH-WAXMAN ACT FUNDAMENTALS, supra 
note 10, at 2. 
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reverse payment.63 These reverse payments may also be referred to as  
“pay-for-delay settlements” or “reverse payment settlements.” The 
Supreme Court noted that “most . . . reverse payment settlement 
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and 
specifically in the context of suits brought under [the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
challenging] the validity of a patent owned by an already-approved  
brand-name drug owner.”64 It is nearly unheard of outside of the 
pharmaceutical context for a party that owns a patent “to pay an accused 
infringer to settle the lawsuit.”65 
To understand what a reverse payment settlement is, it is important 
to understand why a patent infringement lawsuit (which leads to the 
reverse payment settlement) arises in the pharmaceutical context in the 
first place. Reverse payments occur under this framework because  
brand-name companies ideally want to settle paragraph IV patent 
litigation.66 The reason for this desire to settle appears to be, at least on its 
face, to avoid the high costs of the patent litigation. However, brand-name 
companies may also settle to avoid patent litigation because they know 
that their patent is invalid, and the generic company would likely gain 
entry into the market sooner than the expiration of that patent. 
In these types of patent disputes, companies typically settle under 
terms that require: (1) the generic drug manufacturer, or “the claimed 
infringer, not to produce” the generic drug for an amount of time agreed 
upon by the parties; and (2) the brand-name manufacturer, or the patentee, 
to pay the generic drug manufacturer something of high value.67 “Because 
the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than 
the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a 
‘reverse payment’ settlement agreement.”68 Stated concisely by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the typical reverse payment settlement takes the form of: 
“Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two 
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed 
infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term 
expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of 
dollars.”69 In other words, “[t]he patent holder eventually settles the suit 
by providing cash or something else of value, referred to as a reverse 
 
 63. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for 
Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004) [hereinafter Sensible Antitrust Rules]. 
 64. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141; see also Sensible Antitrust Rules, supra note 63, at 24. 
 65. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155; In re Liptor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 535 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 66. PRAC. L. ANTITRUST, supra note 36, at 3. 
 67. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140–41. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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payment, to the generic [drug manufacturer].”70 A brand-name drug 
manufacturer may “ultimately enter into reverse payment settlements with 
several generic firms relating to a single branded drug.”71 
Additionally, reverse payments substantially affect the market. 
These agreements prevent generic medications from entering the  
market as the Hatch-Waxman Act intended: before the brand-name 
company’s patent term expires. These agreements may also extend the 
patent holder’s limited monopoly where the brand-name company pays 
the generic company to stay out of the market even after the expiration of 
its patent term.72 
Even though reverse payments may look like a way for brand-name 
and generic pharmaceutical companies to settle patent disputes without 
diving into costly litigation, these settlements raise very significant and 
pressing policy concerns. In regard to patent law, a reverse payment may 
mean that a weak patent remains unchallenged.73 Reverse payments create 
a significant loophole. Since pharmaceutical companies know that 
paragraph IV certification automatically triggers an infringement dispute, 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies can hold weak patents  
because they know they can settle without ever needing to defend the 
validity of their patents. 
In regard to antitrust law, reverse payments “allow brand-name drugs 
to hold onto their control of the market.”74 Furthermore, these potentially 
“weak patents . . . enable their holders to charge supracompetitive prices,” 
which “prevent[] generic drugs from entering the market and competing 
with the brand-name drug manufacturer.”75 As a result, “supracompetitive 
prices persist and follow-on innovation is [impeded, and these] 
settlement[s] . . . [have] consequences inconsistent with the objectives of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act and [that are] harmful to consumers.”76 This lack 
of competition creates and allows brand-name drug companies to hold 
monopolies in the market, which have detrimental effects on consumers’ 
access to affordable medications.77 
Supporters of reverse payments argue that brand-name drug 
companies need to recoup the high costs of creating new drugs to increase 
 
 70. PRACTICAL LAW ANTITRUST, supra note 36, at 3. 
 71. Id. at 1. 
 72. See Mazzucato, supra note 20 (recognizing extension of patents beyond the initial  
twenty-year protection); Actavis, 570 U.S. at 162 (Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, addressing 
“actions [that] go beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the patent”). 
 73. Sturiale, supra note 37, at 80. 
 74. Kang, supra note 18, at 78. 
 75. Sturiale, supra note 37, at 80. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148. 
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innovation, and reverse payments protect the exclusive patent rights 
afforded to the inventors of those drugs.78 However, this reasoning does 
not warrant anticompetitive reverse payments for three reasons. First, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of increasing access to affordable medication 
cannot be disregarded in the name of capitalism.79 Second, reverse 
payment settlements may extend the life of a brand-name company’s 
patent even longer than its original term.80 Third, scholars suggest that the 
monetary value associated with reverse payment settlements does not 
correlate with the amount needed to recoup the costs of invention.81 
Generic manufacturers’ failure to release their products into the 
market via the Hatch-Waxman exception leads to a lack of competition in 
the market, which means that consumers are forced to pay the prices set 
by the brand-name drug manufacturers.82 Brand-name drug manufacturers 
often set exceedingly high prices, barring citizens from accessing 
affordable medications, many of which might be vital to a person’s life. 
 
 78. See Amber N. Sanges, Comment, Earth to Congress—The Pharmaceutical Patent System Is 
Broken—Pharma Patents Need Their Own Set of Rules, 41 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 112 (2016); see also 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 
15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 8 (2014) [hereinafter Anticompetitive Patent Settlements] (“A pay-for-
delay settlement preserves the exclusive right created by the patent but requires the patentee to share 
the profits with the first generic filer.”) However, Hovenkamp further noted that “[t]he arrangement is 
thus similar to a situation in which two firms cartelize their market but one of them shuts down its 
plant altogether while the other compensates it out of its monopoly profits.” Id. 
 79. “The Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) estimated that these deals cost American 
consumers $3.5 billion a year.” Kang, supra note 18, at 78. Hovenkamp noted: “In the Hatch-Waxman 
pay-for-delay setting . . . what is being placed at risk is both the investment of the pioneer and the 
welfare of consumers, and these two interests pull in opposite directions.” Anticompetitive Patent 
Settlements, supra note 78, at 11. “[C]onsumers . . . stand to lose the benefits of competition that 
would otherwise have occurred.” Id. 
 80. See Mazzucato, supra note 20; Valerie Bauman, Pharma Pay-For-Delay Deals Called ‘Cost 
of Doing Business,’ BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 10, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-
life-sciences/pharma-pay-for-delay-settlements-cost-of-doing-business [https://perma.cc/5VH6-
T3H3] (noting that brand-name company AbbVie’s settlements with generic companies have granted 
AbbVie “an additional four-plus years of market exclusivity”). A generic manufacturer may even 
agree to “cancel the launch of its authorized generic” drug altogether. Kang, supra note 18, at 78. 
 81. “The size of the payment [may] signal[] the degree of doubt about the underlying patent 
dispute” even though the “likelihood of a pay-for-delay settlement is not driven by the likelihood that 
the patent will be found invalid, . . . the size of the settlement will be.” Anticompetitive Patent 
Settlements, supra note 78, at 10, 12. Although Hovenkamp mentions that “[t]he generic’s calculus 
depends on the size of anticipated profits under entry as opposed to the value of the settlement,” he 
does not mention that the brand-name company’s calculus depends on size of anticipated profits to 
recoup innovation costs. Id. at 12. Further, “it may still be more valuable for the generic to share the 
monopoly returns with the pioneer patentee for the duration of the settlement agreement, rather than 
produce in competition with the pioneer,” signaling that the brand-name company may pay the generic 
more to settle than what competition in the market would cost the brand-name company. Id. at 12. 
 82. “Typically, a company that has developed such a medication will enjoy a period of time 
during which it can sell it exclusively and at a supracompetitive price, thereby recovering its 
development costs and turning a profit.” In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183 
(D.R.I. 2014). 
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II. F.T.C. V. ACTAVIS 
A. An Attempt to Remedy Antitrust Policy Concerns 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the 
legitimacy of reverse payment settlements and antitrust concerns in F.T.C. 
v. Actavis.83 In that case, Solvay Pharmaceuticals filed an NDA “for a 
brand-name drug called AndroGel.”84 Subsequently, the FDA approved 
the application, and Solvay obtained a patent.85 Solvay disclosed the fact 
that it filed an NDA to the FDA as the Hatch-Waxman Act requires.86 
“Later the same year . . . , Actavis, Inc. (then known as Watson 
Pharmaceuticals), filed an [ANDA] for a generic drug modeled after 
AndroGel.”87 Soon after, “Paddock Laboratories, . . . separately filed an 
[ANDA] for its own generic product[, and b]oth Actavis and Paddock 
certified under paragraph IV that Solvay’s listed patent was invalid and 
their drugs did not infringe it.”88 
In response to the certifications under paragraph IV, “Solvay 
initiated paragraph IV patent litigation against Actavis and Paddock”89 for 
patent infringement. However, “the patent-litigation parties all settled.”90 
Under the terms of the settlement, Actavis agreed, amongst other things, 
“that it would not bring its generic [drug] to market until . . . 65 months 
before Solvay’s patent expired.”91 The other generic manufacturers that 
were involved made similar promises, and Solvay agreed to pay millions 
of dollars to each generic manufacturer.92 Further, “[t]he paragraph IV 
litigation in this case put the patent’s validity at issue, . . . [but t]he parties’ 
settlement ended that litigation.”93 
The FTC then filed suit against the settling parties, most importantly, 
Solvay, Actavis, and Paddock.94 The FTC’s complaint alleged “that 
respondents violated . . . the [FTC] Act by unlawfully agreeing to abandon 
their patent challenges, to refrain from launching their low-cost generic 
drugs, and to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits.”95 In essence, the FTC 
claimed that “the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendants many millions of 
 
 83. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013). 
 84. Id. at 144. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 145. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 147. 
 94. Id. at 145. 
 95. Id. at 136. 
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dollars to stay out of its market, even though the defendants did not have 
any claim that the plaintiff was liable to them for damages.”96 This case 
made its way up through the federal courts. “Because different courts [had] 
reached different conclusions about the application of the antitrust laws  
to Hatch-Waxman–related patent settlements,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.97 The Supreme Court “answered the antitrust question 
by considering traditional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive 
effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting  
legal considerations present in the circumstances, such as . . . those related 
to patents.”98 
The Court declined to accept the FTC’s argument that it should use 
the “‘quick look’ approach” and instead adopted a “‘rule of reason’” 
analysis.99 The quick-look approach shifts the burden to the defendant to 
show “empirical evidence of procompetitive effects.”100 Under a rule of 
reason analysis, a reverse payment settlement survives antitrust scrutiny 
when a court concludes that a practice is “reasonable” and does not 
demonstrate anticompetitive conduct.101 “[T]he likelihood of a reverse 
payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its 
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its 
independence from other services for which it might represent payment, 
and the lack of any other convincing justification.”102 The Court concluded 
that “these considerations, taken together, outweigh . . . the desirability of 
settlements.”103 Chief Justice Roberts pushed back on this notion in his 
dissent, where he rejected the rule of reason analysis to “inquire into the 
anticompetitive effects of such settlements” because he said this approach 
“is without support in any statute, and will discourage the settlement of 
patent litigation.”104 Chief Justice Roberts underscored the important 
notion that the antitrust–patent scale should not tip too heavily in favor of 
antitrust policy considerations. 
 
 96. Id. at 147. Prior to Actavis, the courts were split as to whether to use the quick-look or  
scope-of-the-patent approach (which Chief Justice Roberts mentions in his dissent). See id. at 160 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In Actavis, the Court rejected the FTC’s quick-look approach under which 
“reverse payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful” and instead adopted rule of 
reason analysis. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating 
Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 17 [hereinafter Activating Actavis]. 
 97. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 146. 
 98. Id. at 149. 
 99. Id. at 159 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999) (discussing the 
quick-look and rule-of-reason analysis)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018) [hereinafter The 
Rule of Reason]. 
 102. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159. 
 103. Id. at 158. 
 104. Id. at 160–61 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
2021] Big Pharma, Big Problems 605 
Finally, the Actavis decision established a three-part inquiry for the 
lower courts to use in assessing the “anticompetitive effects”105 of reverse 
payment settlements. First, a district court asks whether a reverse payment 
exists.106 Second, a district court asks whether that reverse payment was 
large and unjustified.107 Third, a district court applies rule of reason 
analysis.108 However, the Court ultimately concluded by giving the lower 
courts broad discretion in applying the rule of reason.109 
B. An Attempt to Remedy Patent Policy Concerns 
The Court in Actavis also addressed the interplay between patent and 
antitrust policy concerns surrounding patent monopolies granted to  
brand-name pharmaceutical companies.110 Chief Justice Roberts, in 
dissent, expressed much discomfort with the idea of antitrust law 
overriding the limited monopolies held by pharmaceutical companies.111 
He argued, “The correct approach should[,] . . . be to ask whether the 
settlement gives . . . monopoly power beyond what the patent already gave 
it” because “[a] patent carves out an exception to the applicability of 
antitrust laws.”112 In order to understand Chief Justice Roberts’ concerns, 
it is important to understand the landscape of patent law and antitrust law 
in reverse payment settlements before Actavis. 
Prior to Actavis, the courts applied the scope-of-the-patent test to 
reverse payment settlements.113 Under this test, “absent sham litigation or 
fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement [was] immune 
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects [fell] within the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”114 Essentially, as long 
as “settlement agreements limit[ed] their breadth to the ‘scope of the 
patent,’”115 no antitrust concerns were raised and reverse payment 
settlements arising under the Hatch-Waxman act were upheld based on 
patent policy grounds.116 However, under the scope-of-the-patent test, 
“courts frequently struggled with the question of what role, if any, 
evidence of patent strength [played] in the analysis of an alleged payment 
 
 105. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 189 (D.R.I. 2014). 
 106. Id. (citing In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 564–66 
(D.N.J. 2014)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 160. 
 110. See generally id. 
 111. Id. at 161 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 160 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 113. See id. at 141. 
 114. Id. at 146 (quoting F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 115. F.T.C. v. AbbVie, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). 
 116. See generally Actavis, 570 U.S. 136. 
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for delay.”117 When pharmaceutical companies engage in reverse payment 
settlements, it is unclear whether the patent holder’s invalid patent or 
desire to extend its monopoly on the market for that drug triggers the 
settlement, and such convergence lent to the courts’ struggles.118 
The majority in Actavis made it clear that litigating the patent is not 
a precursor to bringing an antitrust suit.119 However, the evidence used in 
patent litigation to demonstrate patent strength can be useful in “providing 
a baseline for identifying the expected amount of competition absent the 
settlement, which could then[,] in principle[,] be compared to the terms of 
the settlement.”120 The majority’s opinion signaled that the Court was 
more concerned with attending to antitrust policy concerns than patent 
policy concerns, a perception that Chief Justice Roberts took issue with.121 
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the majority has “in mind a 
regime where courts ignore the patent, and simply conduct an antitrust 
analysis of the settlement without regard to the validity of the patent.”122 
He argued: “[A]ntitrust law has no business prying into a patent settlement 
so long as that settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power 
beyond what the patent itself conferred—unless, of course, the patent was 
invalid, but that again is a question of patent law, not antitrust law.”123 
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that “a patent holder acting within the 
scope of its patent does not engage in any unlawful anticompetitive 
behavior; it is simply exercising the monopoly rights granted to it by the 
Government.”124 His dissent shows that even though the majority 
prioritized antitrust policy concerns over patent policy concerns, some 
members of the Court were still rightfully troubled about what the decision 
would mean for the future of Hatch-Waxman Act patent litigation.125 
C. The Rule of Reason as the Post-Actavis Standard 
The rule of reason “requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that 
defendants with market power have engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct.”126 When a court concludes that a practice is “reasonable” and 
does not demonstrate anticompetitive conduct, such practice survives 
 
 117. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 19. 
 118. See id. at 16. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 161 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 164. 
 123. Id. at 169. 
 124. Id. at 164. 
 125. Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in his dissent. 
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 160 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 126. The Rule of Reason, supra note 101, at 83. 
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antitrust scrutiny.127 Essentially, rule of reason analysis utilizes a “sliding 
scale” for determining reasonableness where the nature of the proof varies 
based on the circumstances.128 The Actavis Court provided “five 
considerations” to guide district courts in applying the rule of reason to 
reverse payments in the pharmaceutical industry.129 One district court 
summarized them accordingly: 
First, [d]oes the payment have the “potential for genuine adverse 
effects on competition”? Second, [i]s the payment justified in some 
way, perhaps because it approximates “litigation expenses saved 
through the settlement” or compensates the patent challenger for 
“other services . . . such as distributing the patented item or helping 
to develop a market for that item”? Third, [d]oes the brand name 
manufacturer have the market power needed to bring about 
anticompetitive harm? Fourth, [d]oes the size of the settlement 
suggest that it is intended to maintain supracompetitive prices and 
serve as a “workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness”? Fifth, 
[c]ould the parties have settled in some way that did not involve the 
use of reverse payments?130 
“The Court’s rule-of-reason approach acknowledges that not all 
reverse payments are anticompetitive: some payments represent avoided 
litigation expenses; some are fair compensation for valuable services 
rendered by the alleged infringer; and some may have other legitimate 
justifications . . . .”131 However, problems with reverse payment 
settlements still exist. Although the Court urged lower courts to consider 
a patent’s potential weakness when assessing whether a reverse payment 
was anticompetitive, “the merits of the patent dispute [still] matter,”132 and 
a large payment does not necessarily imply that the patent litigation would 
have been extensive because the generic company may require a large 
payment for other reasons. For example, the length of time may lead the 
brand-name company to offer the generic company a larger settlement: 
“[t]he longer the Generic agrees to stay out in exchange for a 
payment . . . the greater the joint profits and the more the [brand-name 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 17. 
 129. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 565 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 130. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155–58). The term “supracompetitive” 
refers to when a company prices its product higher than what it would be in a competitive market. See 
Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and 
Legal Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: ANTITRUST DIV., https://www.justice.gov/atr/predatory-pricing-
strategic-theory-and-legal-policy [https://perma.cc/A6ZY-6FLV]. 
 131. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 21. 
 132. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts 
Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 197, 202 (2015). 
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company] must pay.”133 Or, the sole fact that the generic and brand-name 
companies, after settling, can “split the resulting monopoly profits.”134 
III. RECONCILING THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT, REVERSE PAYMENTS, 
AND ACTAVIS 
A. The Paradox 
Brand-name and generic drug companies “can profit by agreeing not 
to compete with each other, so long as they can find a way to split the extra 
profits” and “[t]he longer they avoid competition, the more profits they 
can split.”135 Because the generic company gets a large payment while the 
brand-name company dominates the market for however long the 
companies jointly agree to, both brand-name and generic drug companies 
“have a joint incentive to settle the [patent] suit to avoid competition for 
as long as they can.”136 The paradox is that the Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
aimed to bridge the gap between antitrust and patent law, sparked the need 
for reverse payments; however, reverse payments subject to Actavis 
scrutiny destabilize the critical policies underlying both patent law and the  
Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Even though the Actavis Court addressed how a large and unjustified 
settlement may both indicate a patent’s weakness and have 
anticompetitive effects, conflating these two pieces stretches too far into 
the realm of ignoring patent law to address antitrust policy concerns. 
Following Actavis, the standard seemed to be that “proving that a payment 
is above [a certain] threshold [would create] an inference  
that the settlement is anticompetitive.”137 Specifically, the Court’s 
acknowledgement that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment can 
provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness” seems to address 
patent concerns, but this statement really only helps in antitrust litigation 
by lending to the “inference that the settlement is anticompetitive.”138 
Another way to view the Court’s approach is when “the net reverse 
payment exceeds the patentee’s avoided litigation expense . . . what can 
be inferred is not that the patent is weak in any absolute sense, but rather 
that it is sufficiently weak that the settlement reduces competition.”139 
 
 133. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and Error 
Costs: A Reply to Critics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 1 [hereinafter Actavis and Error Costs]. 
 134. Id. at 7. 
 135. Id. at 1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 17. 
 138. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013); Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 16. 
 139. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 17. 
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However, even assuming that the patent is sufficiently weak may  
be an overreach. 
When big pharma engages in reverse payment settlements, patent 
validity issues are rarely, if ever, resolved even though the Hatch-Waxman 
Act provides “an opportunity for the parties to litigate disputes about 
patent validity.”140 “[T]he patentee’s actual views on patent strength may 
bear little relation to what its alleged sacrifice might suggest, and those 
views may further bear little relation to the actual strength of the patent.”141 
Further, the rule of reason factors noted by the Court might only weigh in 
determining the power of the parties during the settlement.142 To illustrate, 
if the brand-name company’s patent is likely invalid, then the generic drug 
company “will demand a larger payment” from the brand-name drug 
company.143 Reverse payment settlements make this particular kind of 
patent suit, in a sense, irrelevant because the brand-name company likely 
only brings the patent suit to reach a reverse payment settlement with the 
generic company. The patent infringement claim should still be taken 
seriously in order to prevent weak patents and prevent antitrust solutions 
from undermining patent law. 
B. Policy Issues Left Unanswered 
While the Supreme Court in Actavis attempted to ease tension 
between patent and antitrust law, the Court also left many policy issues 
unanswered.144 One issue left unanswered is how to prevent patent validity 
issues from going uncontested. The Actavis Court conflates the idea that 
large reverse payment settlements may not only signal the weakness of a 
patent but also indicate anticompetitive effects. However, a difference 
exists between the two notions: some parties enter into reverse payment 
settlements in order to settle patent litigation and cover the costs of patent 
litigation (which can be very high) while others enter into reverse payment 
settlements in order to keep generic drugs out of the market. Such variant 
intentions should not be treated the same. 
Chief Justice Roberts alluded to this unanswered policy concern in 
his dissent; his “patent-strength approach contrasts with the payment 
approach advanced by the Actavis Court.”145 Eisenberg and Crane note 
 
 140. Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 132, at 238. 
 141. Bryan Gant, Understanding Actavis: How Courts Misinterpret FTC v. Actavis, Inc., and 
How to Get It Right, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 111, 119 (2016). 
 142. See Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 133, at 1. 
 143. Id. 
 144. I want to emphasize that I believe that Actavis was a step in the right direction, and I would 
certainly not go so far as suggesting that we need to honor the strength of the limited patent monopoly 
in all contexts, but rather, I believe there is a way to remedy these conflicting values. 
 145. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 19. 
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that “[i]ncentives to recover patent-generated monopoly profits are a 
feature, not a bug, in the patent system, serving to motivate and reward 
innovators for making new inventions.”146 Thus, a patent grants “the right 
to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.”147 Chief 
Justice Roberts’ analysis suggests that a patent already provides an 
exception to antitrust law, with the argument being: patent holders should 
be able to exercise their lawful patent rights without facing antitrust 
liability.148 The problem Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges is that “a 
large payment may be made to eliminate [even] a small probability of 
losing litigation”; however, the majority would say “that is [still] enough 
for an antitrust violation.”149 
The majority in Actavis in large part rejected patent concerns in favor 
of assessing reverse payment settlements based on antitrust elements. The 
Court does not even leave “open the way to creative defenses [to an 
antitrust claim] rooted in patent policy.”150 Even though Chief Justice 
Roberts favored a scope-of-the-patent approach, he did not provide a 
solution that mends “patent law policy of challenging and eliminating 
invalid patents”151 with antitrust law policy of preventing reverse payment 
settlements from harming consumers.152 Both the majority and the dissent 
seem to agree that avoiding a “patent mini-trial inside an antitrust case”153 
is significant to prevent inefficiency, but patents are not absolute and must 
 
 146. Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 132, at 242. 
 147. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013); see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
 148. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 161; see also Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 215. 
 149. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 19. 
 150. Id. “[A] defendant might present evidence that the patent was valid and infringed” and 
“[s]uch evidence might be thought valuable by providing a baseline for identifying the expected 
amount of competition absent the settlement, which could then in principle be compared to the terms 
of the settlement”; however, “[s]uch a patent-strength approach contrasts with the payment approach 
advanced by the Actavis Court. Id. 
 151. Michael A. Carrier, A Response to Chief Justice Roberts: Why Antitrust Must Play a Role 
in the Analysis of Drug Patent Settlements, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 31, 33 (2014). 
 152. See Gregory, supra note 54, at 127 (noting “many brand and generic manufacturers abuse 
the system by entering into closed-door settlement negotiations that divide the market for the drug, 
increasing their joint profits at the expense of consumers”). 
 153. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 19. 
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be challenged if a reason to do so exists,154 so long as these challenges are 
“still bound to respect antitrust laws spelled out in the Sherman Act.”155 
C. Lower Courts’ Struggle to Produce a Uniform Standard 
The majority opinion in Actavis left open “to the lower courts the 
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”156 The 
majority in Actavis gave district courts broad discretion to develop a 
procedure to collect and appraise this evidence.157 Chief Justice Roberts 
even wished the district courts “[g]ood luck,”158 implying what one district 
judge later openly acknowledged just a year later—“that the holding in 
Actavis was likely to cause district courts . . . much difficulty.”159 The 
Chief Justice’s concerns have proven to be well-founded.160 Because the 
Court chose “an open, case-by-case approach, instructing lower courts to 
analyze the potential anticompetitive effects of each settlement put before 
them[,]”161 lower courts have had “a difficult time”162 applying the Actavis 
standard with some courts simply undermining it.163 
The lower courts seem confounded because “[p]ayment from the 
patent holder to the claimed infringer can take many forms,” and the 
majority did not outline what forms of payment trigger Actavis analysis.164 
 
 154. Patent strength policy concerns are substantial, as evidenced by: “Generic-drug 
manufacturers . . . us[ing] . . . ‘inter partes review’ . . . [to] overturn[] 43 percent of the patents they 
challenged.” Sarah Jane Tribble, Drugmakers Play the Patent Game to Ward off Competitors, NBC 
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/drugmakers-play-patent-game-
ward-competitors-n915911 [https://perma.cc/7B7F-5XMZ]. 
 155. Passinault, supra note 4, at 569; see also F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 141 (2013) 
(noting that the Sherman Act prohibits restraints on trade or commerce and citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(commonly known as the Sherman Act)). “The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a federal statute 
which prohibits activities that restrict interstate commerce and competition in the 
marketplace . . . . The Sherman Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38.” Sherman Antitrust Act, 
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sherman_antitrust_act [https://perma.cc/8SBG-
A64M]. 
 156. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 160 (2013); Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 16. 
 157. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156–60 (providing recommendations for lower courts); Activating 
Actavis, supra note 96, at 18. 
 158. Actavis, 570 U.S at 173 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 159. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 195 (D.R.I. 2014); see also 
Gregory, supra note 54, at 144–45 (stating “district courts are now faced with the difficult task of 
determining which non-cash settlements meet the standard of an antitrust violation without any 
authority from the Supreme Court to help set forth that standard”). 
 160. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 195. 
 161. Passinault, supra note 4, at 569. 
 162. Marc G. Schildkraut, Actavis and the Burden of Proof: Antitrust Revolution, a Muddle, or 
Both, 33 ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 56. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 18. “Actavis ‘fixates on one form of consideration that 
was at issue in the case: cash.’” Marc G. Schildkraut, Actavis, Authorized Generics, and the Future of 
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Specifically, lower courts have different approaches in regard to what 
constitutes “a large and unjustified payment.”165 Further, it is unclear 
whether showing that the payment was large and unjustified is “analyzed 
separately from the rule of reason, or whether it is part of the plaintiff’s 
initial burden under the rule of reason.”166 In early 2014, a district judge 
held that non-monetary reverse payment settlements do not violate 
antitrust laws under Actavis.167 A year later, in King Drug Co. of Florence 
v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., the Third Circuit reversed, holding that 
reverse payment settlement agreements involving non-cash payments may 
trigger Actavis scrutiny and violate antitrust laws.168 The U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California had already reached the same 
conclusion, finding that Actavis applies to non-cash reverse payments 
settlements.169 The district court in In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation 
held that “Actavis requires cash consideration in order to trigger rule of 
reason scrutiny,” but this decision was later vacated and remanded by the 
First Circuit.170 Yet, “[a] majority of courts seem to take the opposite 
position that a reverse payment is not limited to cash payments.”171 
Although these examples comprise a non-exhaustive survey of the lower 
 
Antitrust Law, in 28 HEALTHCARE ANTITRUST, SETTLEMENTS, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 25, 60 (James Langenfeld & Edwin Galeano eds., 2018) [hereinafter Actavis, Authorized 
Generics] (citing In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016)). 
 165. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 163 (2013); see also Karen N. Walker & Gavin R. 
Tisdale, Overstating Actavis: A Muddle Perhaps, But No Revolution—A Reply to Schildkraut, 33 
ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 65. “The lower courts could not find a limiting principle in 
Actavis . . . [and] there are no obvious principles behind the limitations.” Actavis, Authorized 
Generics, supra note 164, at 29. 
 166. Walker & Tisdale, supra note 165. 
 167. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 566 (D.N.J. 2014), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 
388 (3d Cir. 2015); see also PRAC. L. ANTITRUST, DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY HOLDS THAT ACTAVIS 
APPLIES ONLY TO MONETARY REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS, Westlaw Note 3-555-5347 (Jan. 27, 
2014). 
 168. King Drug Co. of Florence, 791 F.3d at 403; see also PRAC. L. ANTITRUST, THIRD CIRCUIT: 
ACTAVIS APPLIES TO NON-CASH PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS, Westlaw Note 8-616-8206 (June 29, 
2015). 
 169. United Food & Com. Workers Loc. 1776 & Participating Emps. Health & Welfare Fund v. 
Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that “courts need 
not restrict the definition of ‘payments’ under Actavis to cash”); PRAC. L. ANTITRUST, ND CAL. JUDGE 
HOLDS THAT ACTAVIS APPLIES TO NON-CASH PAYMENTS, Westlaw Note 0-589-2745 (Nov. 21, 2014) 
 170. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 195 (D.R.I. 2014), vacated and 
remanded, 814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Kang, supra note 18, at 94. 
 171. Kang, supra note 18, at 94; see also Sophie Lawrance & Edwin Bond, ‘Reverse-Payment’ 
Patent Settlement Agreements: Non-Cash Value Transfers Are Not Immune from Competition Law 
Scrutiny, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 552, 553 (2018) (noting that most courts adopted the view 
“that non-cash value transfers from originator to generic companies should be subject to the same rule-
of-reason analysis as transfers of cash”). For more information on cash versus non-cash payments, see 
generally Actavis, Authorized Generics, supra note 164. 
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courts’ methods of applying Actavis, such examples underscore a lack of 
uniformity in addressing reverse payment disputes. 
Lower courts are also left with little, if any, guidance on how to 
address patent validity concerns. “[T]rial courts handling these antitrust 
cases will continue to be faced with evidence and arguments regarding 
patent validity or invalidity.”172 However, the majority in Actavis  
did not provide lower courts with a standard for addressing patent  
validity concerns arising in the context of antitrust litigation over  
reverse payments. 
Lower courts are fiercely laboring over a solution to the unanswered 
questions in Actavis but seem to be falling down a rabbit hole, focusing 
too narrowly on what types of payments constitute a large and unjustified 
payment.173 Regardless of cash or non-cash payment, big pharma’s drive 
for increased profits will lead pharmaceutical companies to find ways to 
settle.174 Before focusing narrowly on these specific issues, lower  
courts need to step back and pinpoint a standard for addressing validity of 
the patent prior to assessing any antitrust concerns.175 This patent–antitrust 
 
 172. Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, The Actavis 
Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 585, 617 (2015) [hereinafter The Actavis 
Inference]. “Perhaps the starkest instances arise in antitrust cases where, subsequent to the reverse-
payment settlement in question, but prior to the resolution of the antitrust case, the relevant patent is 
litigated and found to be either valid or invalid.” Id. “A second situation arises if the antitrust court is 
asked to relitigate the patent case to assess its likely outcome, an unappetizing task . . . .” Id. 
 173. The FTC has even recognized that non-cash “agreements [may] raise even further antitrust 
concerns [more than reverse cash payments] because they embody a second, additional agreement not 
to compete.” Lawrance & Bond, supra note 171, at 553 (quoting FTC amicus brief in King Drug Co. 
of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015)). Lawrance and Bond focus on 
a specific type of non-cash agreement, known as “no-AG agreements.” Lawrance & Bond, supra note 
171, at 553. No-AG agreements are “a specific species of patent settlement agreement which involves 
a commitment by the patentee not to launch its own, or an authorized, generic version of its brand-
name drug.” Id. at 552. For more information on no-AG agreements, see generally King Drug, 791 
F.3d 388. 
 174. “Pharmaceutical companies are profit-making entities, after all, that face pressure from their 
shareholders to produce ever-better results.” Robin Feldman, ‘One-and-Done’ for New Drugs Could 
Cut Patent Thickets and Boost Generic Competition, STAT (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.stat 
news.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/ [https://perma.cc/BT28-DV6N]. 
Hovenkamp remarks on big pharma’s drive for high profit margins: “of course” pharmaceutical 
companies “want larger profits.” Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law and Patent Settlement Design, 32 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 417, 423 (2019). Generic companies are “willing to be restrained excessively” in 
settling “to accept a disproportionately long delay period, or a disproportionately high royalty—in 
exchange for the opportunity to face a smaller competitive field upon entering the market.” Id. at 461. 
Further, “a reduction in competition will be reflected by both an increase in total profits and a reduction 
in consumer welfare.” Id. at 432. 
 175. See The Actavis Inference, supra note 172, at 617 (“A subsequent finding of patent 
invalidity does not imply that there was an antitrust violation, regardless of the presence or size of a 
reverse payment. Nor does a subsequent finding of patent infringement imply there was no antitrust 
violation despite a large and unexplained reverse payment.”). 
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tension should be addressed through legislative reform rather than placing 
the heavy burden on lower courts to grasp at creating uniformity. 
IV. HOW TO AID LOWER COURTS IN ADDRESSING UNANSWERED POLICY 
CONCERNS 
A successful solution should both provide consumers with access to 
affordable medication and promote innovation.176 As Hovenkamp, a 
renowned antitrust scholar,177 noted: “antitrust must always step lightly” 
because “pharmaceutical markets are characterized by a high degree of 
innovation[,]” so “[a]ntitrust remedies that unnecessarily deprive [brand-
name companies] of patent rights or . . . reduce the value of prospective 
patenting are likely to do more harm than good to the long run performance 
of the industry.”178 However, of paramount importance to the consumer is 
the timing of generic medication entry into the market, which brings 
competition and lower prices.179 
In the wake of COVID-19, as big pharma swiftly produced 
vaccinations and continually work to develop medications and treatments 
to stop the pandemic, now is the time to alleviate the growing tension 
between patent and antitrust law. First, this Note calls on legislators to 
amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to incorporate the following changes: a 
tiered approach to ANDA filings; the choice of either an inter partes 
review180 or standard federal court patent litigation for resolving patent 
disputes; and subjecting all forms of reverse payments to Actavis rule of 
reason analysis. Although legislative reform is no small task,181 this 
legislative reform most succinctly addresses patent and antitrust policy 
concerns. However, because legislative reform is such a sizeable goal, 
 
 176. See Sensible Antitrust Rules, supra note 63, at 11–12. 
 177. Herbert Hovenkamp is recognized for his “lifetime contributions to antitrust law.” Herbert 
Hovenkamp, UNIV. OF PENN. CAREY L. SCH., https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/hhovenka/ 
[https://perma.cc/852N-ZGVZ]. 
 178. See Sensible Antitrust Rules, supra note 63, at 12. 
 179. Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 132, at 239. 
 180. An inter partes review is a procedural method to challenge patent validity. See infra Part 
IV.A. Also note the statistics regarding inter partes review. See Tribble, supra note 154. 
 181. I do not want to be naïve to the political aspects of this suggestion. I understand that a 
legislative effort would not only encounter procedural hurdles but may also raise significant political 
concerns. Given that big pharma lobbying efforts can influence, I recognize that people may have 
valid concerns about proposing a legislative solution. To support this notion, see Lim’s 
acknowledgement that “[s]elf-interest drives incumbents to entrench their dominance and thwart 
challenge.” Daryl Lim, Biologics as the New Antitrust Frontier: Reflections, Riposte, and 
Recommendations, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 209 (2018). However, viewed separately and 
categorically, antitrust and patent ideals do not congregate on one end of the political spectrum. There 
are key players on either side of the debate because both brand-name and generic companies comprise 
big pharma, which plays a large role in influencing politics as a whole. Therefore, even in light of 
political concerns, I believe that legislative reform would be the most effective pathway to appease 
parties on both sides. 
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reform should be made through common law, where federal courts would 
work to create a uniform standard in approaching pay-for-delay settlement 
litigation arising out of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Lawmakers should act now⎯tensions are too high between patent 
and antitrust law to continue in this COVID-19 pandemic absent a uniform 
standard for addressing reverse payments. 
A. Legislative Approach 
First, legislators should amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to create a 
tiered approach to ANDA filing. Such a tiered approach to ANDA filling 
could encompass the following aspects. Similar to the current structure of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first generic drug manufacturer to file an 
ANDA would enjoy a period of exclusivity in the market. Because the 
Hatch-Waxman Act already incentivizes generic drug companies to pay 
the costs of litigation through its exclusivity period, this exclusivity 
granted under paragraph IV should remain. However, the Act should be 
amended to extend this period of exclusivity from 180 days to five years, 
granting the first generic drug manufacturer to file an ANDA five years of 
exclusivity in the generic drug market. The exclusivity period should also 
apply to the next generic drug manufacturer to file an ANDA, where, after 
the first generic drug manufacturer’s five-year exclusivity period ends, the 
next generic drug manufacturers would begin, and that company would 
enjoy five years of exclusivity in the market (with the brand-name and first 
generic manufacturer), and so on. This process would continue until the 
brand-name company’s patent term expires, after which all generic 
manufacturers would gain access to the market. 
By carving out a way for generic drug companies to enter into the 
market sooner, the Hatch-Waxman Act paved the way for reverse payment 
settlements and undermined antitrust issues the Act aimed to resolve. This 
proposed legislative change addresses antitrust and patent policy concerns 
by allowing generic medications to enter the market sooner than a typical, 
permitted patent term. Additionally, this change would allow the  
brand-name company the ability to not only recoup its innovation costs, 
but also turn a profit because the market size for the particular drug is 
reduced to a limited number of pharmaceutical companies for the duration 
of the patent term.182 Having only two drugs on the market for five years 
 
 182. By extending the exclusivity for five years and only allowing one generic drug to enter the 
market during that time, data shows that the brand-name company can still recoup costs of innovation 
and turn a profit. See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183 (D.R.I. 2014). 
“[W]here there is a single generic competitor, the generic tends to be priced approximately 25% lower 
than the brand name counterpart. And, where there are multiple generic alternatives, the price of the 
generics typically falls to 50% to 80% below the brand name product.” Id. 
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(one brand-name and one generic), then three drugs on the market for five 
years (one brand-name and two generics), and so on, allows for 
competition, but less competition than if all generic manufacturers to file 
ANDAs flooded the market at once. 
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act should be amended to give 
companies the option of either an inter partes review with the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) or 
foregoing the standard federal litigation to assess the validity of the 
patent.183 Regardless of inter partes review or federal court litigation, the 
remaining process under the Hatch-Waxman Act apply would still apply. 
The paragraph IV route still “automatically counts as patent infringement” 
and would trigger patent litigation.184 If the court were to determine that 
the brand-name company’s patent is not infringed, then the generic drug 
would be approved and the generic drug company would enjoy five-year 
exclusivity.185 If, on the other hand, the court were to determine that the 
brand-name company’s patent has been infringed and the case is not 
successfully appealed, then the approval would be made effective no 
earlier than the expiration of the patent.186 
Amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to specifically allow for inter 
partes review addresses one of the driving factors behind reverse payment 
settlements: costly patent litigation. Inter partes review “provide[s]  
a specialized forum to resolve complex, scientific issues associated with 
an invention.”187 Inter partes review also alleviates costly patent litigation 
in federal court188 and “is statutorily required to be complete within  
one year of institution, except that the time may be extended up to six 
 
 183. This suggestion aligns with the recent trend in pharmaceutical litigation: “pharmaceutical 
companies have been simultaneously settling federal court litigation and a proceeding before the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)” in inter partes review. Jamie 
Towey & Brad Albert, Then, Now, and Down the Road: Trends in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements 
After FTC v. Actavis, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BLOG (May 28, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/competition-matters/2019/05/then-now-down-road-trends-pharmaceutical-patent 
[https://perma.cc/WUQ5-BT7M]. 
 184. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 143 (2013); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
 185. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Further, if the court “decides that the patent is invalid or 
not infringed . . . the approval shall be made effective” either on “the date on which the court enters 
judgment . . . or [on] the date of a settlement order or consent decree signed and entered by the court 
stating that the patent that is the subject of the certification is invalid or not infringed.” Id. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 
 186. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 
 187. Francisco Javier Espinosa, Big Pharma Versus Inter Partes Review: Why the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Should Seek Logical Hatch-Waxman Reform over Inter Partes Review 
Exemption, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 352 (2017). 
 188. Inter partes review or “IPR was designed to be less expensive and less time consuming than 
district court proceedings.” Id. 
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months for good cause.”189 Inter partes review would drastically reduce 
the amount of time and money the parties would spend litigating the 
validity of a patent.190 
Lastly, legislators should amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to make all 
forms of reverse payment subject to the Actavis rule of reason analysis. 
This proposition is intended to disincentivize big pharma from engaging 
in reverse payments because almost all reverse payments delay generic 
medication entry into the market in some way.191 Further, while the Actavis 
Court played an important role in untangling the reverse payment chaos, 
at this point, legislative change is imperative. Although critics argue that 
reverse payments are becoming less prominent, the FTC noted that 
“[c]ompanies are settling more cases on more pharmaceutical products 
than before the Actavis decision.”192 The problem is that even though the 
kinds of reverse payments that currently trigger antitrust scrutiny have 
declined, “companies [have] found other ways to settle.”193 And while 
companies use reverse payments that the courts have deemed 
acceptable,194 the definition of a “large and unjustified payment” has 
narrowed substantially.195 Regardless of that fact, “pay-for-delay is most 
certainly still happening[.]”196 Amending the Act to subject all forms of 
 
 189. America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions: How Long Will an Inter Partes 
Review Take?, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-
and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#type-inter-partes-
review [https://perma.cc/3W3X-ZTMB]. 
 190. I understand that the mechanics behind incorporating inter partes review into reverse 
payment settlement litigation would also need to be addressed with regard to patent legislation. 
However, I will only briefly provide my thoughts on this matter. Although inter partes review is 
typically “used by anyone who is not the owner of a patent who wants to challenge a patent’s 
validity[,]” the PTAB should automatically grant an inter partes review in the context of paragraph 
IV litigation so long as the brand-name company wishes to resolve the patent dispute via inter partes 
review because paragraph IV certification automatically counts as patent infringement. Espinosa, 
supra note 187, at 352. Further because “[t]he petitioner [in an inter partes review proceeding] must 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that he/she would prevail as to at least one of the 
claims challenged to trigger an inter partes review[,]” I also suggest that the brand-name company’s 
petition for an inter partes review automatically count as “reasonable likelihood.” See America Invents 
Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions: What Is the Standard for Instituting an Inter Partes Review 
and Who Will Decide Whether the Standard Is Met?, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-
frequently-asked#type-inter-partes-review [https://perma.cc/3W3X-ZTMB]. 
 191. “If we want to change the system, we must change the incentives driving the system.” 
Feldman, supra note 174. 
 192. Towey & Albert, supra note 183. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Bauman, supra note 80. 
 196. Id. 
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reverse payments to Actavis rule of reason scrutiny would disincentivize 
anticompetitive settlements.197 
Further, one of the goals “of creating the [p]aragraph IV challenge 
process was to provide a mechanism through which generic manufacturers 
could challenge weak patents.”198 Subjecting all reverse payments  
to antitrust scrutiny would pigeonhole pharmaceutical companies into 
concluding patent disputes rather than settling without determining  
the validity of a patent. This notion is especially important given that 
“[p]harmaceutical companies have become adept at maneuvering through 
the system of patent and non-patent rights to create mountains of rights 
that can be applied, one after another.”199 Disincentivizing pay-for-delay 
settlements so that pharmaceutical companies will engage in patent 
litigation may also discourage brand-name companies from obtaining  
new patents on minor tweaks to medications200 because the brand-name 
companies will not want to spend money to resolve numerous  
patent claims. 
Amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to incorporate a tiered approach 
to ANDA filing eases generic medications into the market, allowing 
brand-name companies the entirety of their patent term to profit with 
restricted competition while still granting the public access to affordable 
medication. Amending the Act to specifically allow parties an inter partes 
review to resolve patent disputes addresses the issue of parties engaging 
in reverse payments in lieu of traditional, expensive patent litigation. 
Amending the Act to render all forms of reverse payments subject to rule 
of reason analysis disincentivizes big pharma from engaging in reverse 
payments that delay entry of generic medications into the market. 
B. Common Law Approach 
Aside from legislative reform, courts can create a uniform standard 
at the judicial level by hearing evidence of patent validity or invalidity 
prior to resolving antitrust claims. Adopting some elements of patent 
litigation can also help rebut claims of anticompetitive reverse payments. 
Although the Actavis Court warned against patent trials within antitrust 
 
 197. This is because “antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement” may “require the parties 
to engage in time-consuming, complex, and expensive litigation to demonstrate what would have 
happened to competition absent the settlement.” F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 137 (2013). 
California has already adopted a strict approach to reverse payments: “California’s Assembly Bill 
824 . . . declares that any reverse payment is ‘presumed to have anticompetitive effects’ under the 
state’s Cartwright Act.” Bauman, supra note 80. 
 198. Gregory, supra note 54, at 127. 
 199. Feldman, supra note 174. 
 200. See Feldman, supra note 174. “This behavior lets drug companies keep competitors out of 
the market and beat them back when they get there.” Id. 
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trials, permitting evidence imperative to the patent dispute would help 
ensure that the pharmaceutical patent in question is not weak. However, 
such a showing of patent strength need not be extensive. 
Tangentially, courts should also hold all reverse payments that 
extend a brand-name pharmaceutical company’s limited monopoly 
beyond the twenty-year term a per se violation of antitrust law.201 These 
settlements grossly “undermine the regulatory framework of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which was intended to speed the entry of generic drugs and 
stimulate innovation by research-based pharmaceutical companies.”202 
Because Actavis already allows the lower courts leeway in applying 
the rule of reason, federal courts should subject all reverse payments to 
Actavis rule of reason scrutiny but should require a pre-trial hearing with 
limited discovery to assess patent claims. Payments larger than those that 
“would be expected from the outcome of the patent case” “look[] 
suspiciously like payment to avoid more competition” and essentially 
“create[] an inference that the settlement is anticompetitive,”203 thus 
ignoring the issue of patent validity. A pre-trial hearing addressing patent 
validity would not only resolve this issue, but also uncover a more accurate 
estimate of the avoided patent litigation costs, a factor that may lead the 
court to determine that no further antitrust analysis is necessary. Further, 
if the pre-trial hearing reveals that the brand-name company’s patent  
is valid and infringed, then the generic company would not gain entry into 
the market.  
This suggestion is also efficient. Because the Court in Actavis was 
concerned with the efficiency of “a patent mini-trial inside an antitrust 
case[,]”204 one proposal is for courts to remand these antitrust cases to the 
lower courts to resolve patent disputes prior to moving forward with the 
antitrust litigation. However, this proposal is inefficient because it halts 
antitrust litigation to resolve patent claims that should have been resolved 
at the onset of paragraph IV litigation as intended by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act. Conversely, a pre-trial hearing assessing any patent issues would 
allow patent claims and antitrust claims to be resolved as one matter. This 
proposed structure would allow for the patent dispute to be resolved (to 
some extent) without the need for a whole separate, lengthy patent trial 
 
 201. See Mazzucato supra note 20; F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 162 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing against “actions [that] go beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the 
patent”). 
 202. Jamie Towey, Quo Vadis Post-Actavis?, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2016/03/quo-vadis-post-actavis [https:// 
perma.cc/6ZXC-A46P]. 
 203. Activating Actavis, supra note 96, at 16–17. “Unless there is another explanation for the 
payment, that inference should stand.” Id. at 17. 
 204. Id. at 19. 
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within the antitrust trial. Nonetheless, a common law approach would only 
move forward with antitrust litigation where the patent is found to be 
invalid or not infringed, in which the patent evidence from the pre-trial 
hearing can be used to disprove anticompetitive effects of the reverse 
payment in dispute. Upon resolution of the patent dispute, the courts  
would still assess the reverse payment using the rule of reason analysis 
from Actavis. 
Although legislative reform is preferred, because legislative reform 
is such a sizeable goal, courts should work to adopt a uniform standard in 
approaching pay-for-delay settlements. Further, such common law reform 
may spark change at the legislative level by showing Congress that change 
is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
When considering reform, it is important to strike a balance between 
providing the public access to affordable medication, on the one hand, and 
promoting pharmaceutical innovation, on the other hand. Amending the 
Hatch-Waxman Act strikes such a balance. The legislative changes 
alleviate tension between antitrust and patent law by facilitating delivery 
of generic medication to the public while protecting innovation and 
allowing brand-name companies to turn a profit. Further, federal courts 
should work to adopt a uniform common law standard, assessing patent 
validity before addressing antitrust concerns. 
Regardless, antitrust and patent policy concerns must be considered 
in conjunction, especially given that big pharma suited for battle against 
COVID-19. Lawmakers should seriously consider the future ramifications 
of our current system which lacks uniformity in an area of law that so 
severely impacts the lives of United States citizens.205 No better time exists 
to address this tension in the pharmaceutical context than now, in light of 
the rush to develop treatments and medications aimed at preventing illness 
 
 205. Although a slightly different context, the pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences was 
recently granted a limited monopoly for a medication being tested to treat COVID-19. Although 
Gilead ended up giving up the limited monopoly, such power over the market still raises future 
concerns. For more information, see Ed Silverman, Under Intense Criticism, Gilead Forsakes 
Monopoly Status for Its Experimental Covid-19 Drug, STAT (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.stat 
news.com/pharmalot/2020/03/25/gilead-covid19-coronavirus-orphan-drug/ [https://perma.cc/A5N3-
EZEU]; Lee Fang & Sharon Lerner, Coronavirus Treatment Developed By Gilead Sciences Granted 
“Rare Disease” Status, Potentially Limiting Affordability, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://theintercept.com/2020/03/23/gilead-sciences-coronavirus-treatment-orphan-drug-status/ 
[https://perma.cc/QGJ2-D8XB]; Jonathan Gardner, In Rare Move, Gilead Gives Up ‘Orphan’ Status 
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and death caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Lawmakers must step up 
to battle against the pharmaceutical companies that are blocking 
consumers’ access to affordable medications through reverse payment 
settlement agreements. 
